An Ecological Call
to Arms Characterized by an understanding of the interconnection of all life forms and a growing awareness of the consequences of pollution, this ethos gave rise to a new force within Canadian society-the environmental activists. By 1971 environmentalists had organized in all of the country's major urban centres, capping a remarkable burst of political activism.
Despite the rise of the environmental movement as a powerful political force, little is known about its Canadian origins. Historians in the United States frequently cite the battle to prevent the damming of Echo Park in the 1950s, the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962, and the celebration of the rst Earth Day in 1970 as key moments in the movement's birth. 2 However, none of these events were directly responsible for the emergence of environmental activism in Canada. Echo Park did not engage the Canadian masses. Silent Spring was a best-seller in Canada that inspired a broad spectrum of the population, including many environmentalists-to-be. Nonetheless, it too failed to ignite environmental activism in this country, as the rst organizations did not appear until several years a er its publication. e rst Earth Day, meanwhile, passed with little fanfare outside of the United States, and otherwise occurred a er the rst batch of environmental activist organizations had been launched in Canada. Clearly, one needs to look elsewhere to identify the key galvanizing force behind the ascendency of Canadian environmental activism.
is essay argues that the 22 October 1967 broadcast of e Air of Death was a central event in the emergence of environmental activism in Ontario. A production of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [CBC] , e Air of Death examined air pollution's adverse impact upon the environment. Heavily promoted by the CBC, e Air of Death proved to be a ratings hit as well as a critical success. It also drew the ire of industrial interests due to its allegations of human uorosis poison- 
Résumé: Cet article soutient que l'émission " e Air of Death", télévisée le 22 octobre 1967, a été l'événement central dans l'émergeance de l'activisme en ironemental en Ontario. Une production de la section anglaise de Radio-Canada (the CBC), " e Air of Death" examinait l'impact néfaste de la pollution sur l'en ironement. Ce documentaire a été vivement critiqué par des intérêts industriels, à cause de ses allégations d'empoisonnement de plusieurs habitants de Dunn ille Ontario. Le lm et ses producteurs ont été soumis à deux enquêtes: une commission royale commandée par le gouvernement ontarien, et une investigation par le Conseil de la Radio-télévision canadienne. Cette contro erse a mené à la création des deux premières organisations d'activistes en ironementalistes, notamment Pollution Probe à l'Université de Toronto, qui allait jouer un rôle essentiel dans la formation de la communauté en ironementaliste ontarienne.
ing, a crippling condition caused by the ingestion of excessive uorine, in Dunnville, Ontario. Subsequently, the lm and the team behind it were subjected to two high-pro le investigations, an Ontario-ordered Royal Commission and a Canadian Radio-Television Commission [CRTC] hearing. e Air of Death was not the rst documentary to raise concerns about Canada's environment, nor was it even the rst documentary to address uorosis pollution in Dunnville. However, a combination of the publicity surrounding the documentary and the subsequent public inquiries transformed e Air of Death into a cause célèbre that mobilized the public in a manner previously unseen in Canada, giving rise to the rst generation of Ontario's environmental activists.
In her study of the ght against phosphate pollution in the Great Lakes, Jennifer Read noted the "emergence of environmental values" in Ontario during the mid-1960s. However, Read also noted that "at this point the concern still lacked focus." 3 As this article demonstrates, e Air of Death played a key role in crystallizing the foci of environmentally-conscious Ontarians, inspiring the creation of the province's initial environmental activist organizations. Despite this, the story of e Air of Death has gone largely unexamined. While a number of articles and books have made passing reference to the documentary, none have devoted more than a few lines to the subject. 4 Given its historic signi cance an examination of e Air of Death, the ensuing controversy, and its legacy, is in order.
Background
T he environmental ethos was the result of a con uence of postwar trends. According to sociologist Ronald Inglehart, the unrivalled a uence and physical security enjoyed by the Western population in the postwar years resulted in the shi of values "towards a greater emphasis on the quality of life." 5 Historian Samuel P. Hays points towards the expansion of outdoor recreation in the 1950s, which helped give the masses an appreciation for the inherent value of natural areas. He notes that this later "became infused with attempts to cope with" air, water, and chemical pollution. 6 Other key developments during the postwar period include the growing popularity of ecology, which examines the interrelationship between organisms and their environments, the rapid expansion and democratization of postsecondary education, and the grow-ing prominence of scienti c public intellectuals that helped articulate concern for the environmental crisis. 7 is article maintains a distinction between conservation and environmentalism. While related, the movements di ered in important ways. As John McCormick explains in Reclaiming Paradise:
e Global En ironmental Mo ement, if nature protection had been a moral crusade centered on the nonhuman environment and conservation a utilitarian movement centered on the rational management of natural resources, environmentalism centered on humanity and its surroundings …. ere was [in environmentalism] a broader conception of the place of man in the biosphere, a more sophisticated understanding of that relationship, and a note of crisis that was greater and broader than it had been in the earlier conservation movement. 8 is line of reasoning is echoed by Samuel Hays, who writes in "A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Environmentalism, " that the "conservation movement was associated with e orts of managerial and technical leaders to use physical resources more e ciently; the environmental movement sought to improve the quality of the air, water, and land as a human environment. Conservation arose out of the production or supply side of the economy, the environment out of the consumer or demand side."
9 Michael Egan further distinguishes the two movements, noting that that in environmentalism "the human body became an ecological landscape worth protecting: human health was more fully recognized as a product of the larger ecology." 10 ere are those that downplay the di erentiation between these two movements. For example, Tina Loo's award-winning study of wildlife conservation, States of Nature, broadly de nes environmentalism "as a concern for the natural world."
11 Gerald Killan and George Warecki refer to the work of the Algonquin Wildlands League, which was founded in 1968 with the goal of protecting select Ontario hinterlands from development, interchangeably as "preservationist, " "conservationist, " and "environmentalist."
12 However, as Robert Paehlke has noted, Canadian environmental activist organizations expressed little interest in issues concerning wildlife habitat and the forests during the 1960s and 1970s. is distinction would diminish over time, highlighted by environmentalists' concern over the disappearance of tropical rainforests in the 1980s.
13
For the sake of historical accuracy, the distinction between conservation and environmentalism is maintained within this article.
e Birth of e Air of Death I n November 1966 the Canadian Council of Resource Ministers sponsored "Pollution and Our Environment, " a ve day conference in Montreal. Conceived as a gathering place for Canada's leading minds to identify key environmental issues, the event attracted over 600 delegates representing government, industry, and the public, in addition to 400 observers from across Canada and abroad. Attendance at this conference proved to be a pivotal event in the career of Larry Gosnell, the CBC Department of Farm and Fisheries' media delegate. Born on the family farm in Orford Township, Ontario, on 18 May 1923, Gosnell went on to study agronomics at the Ontario Agriculture College in Guelph. While Gosnell's work as a radio and television producer focused upon social and economic issues a ecting rural Canada, much of his early work celebrated the bene ts provided by scienti c advances in agricultural. By the late 1950s his tone acquired a critical edge and farmers' widespread use of chemical sprays became a point of interest. is subject was addressed in his 1960 National Film Board [NFB] production Poisons, Pests and People, which highlighted the dangers insecticides presented to humans, farm animals, and plants. However, this version of the lm was not broadcast, as senior management at the NFB demanded re-writes that accentuated the bene t of insecticides.
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to study agronomics at the Ontario Ag Despite his early work on the ecological consequences of insecticides, "Pollution and Our Environment" proved to be an eye-opening event for Gosnell, who later explained that "For me the Conference was a revelation on the degree of pollution that had already happened in our country."
15 Upon his return to Toronto he began to formulate the idea of a threepart prime time television series that would explore air, water, and soil pollution. Despite facing two major impediments-the subject matter was rather gloomy fare for prime time and the Farm and Fisheries Department had no experience producing programming for this vaunted time slot-these concerns subsided when Gosnell recruited Stanley Burke, anchor of e National News, to participate in the project. One of Canada's most recognized and respected gures, Burke had a noted background in journalism, having served as president of the United Nations Correspondents Association, as well as the CBC bureau chief in such locales as Washington and Paris. Described in the contemporary press as "glamorous" and a "dashing gure, " 16 Burke was attracted to the urgent tone of Gosnell's project. When asked about his decision to invite Burke's participation, Gosnell would downplay Burke's celebrity and highlighted his journalistic credentials. 17 Nonetheless, the addition of Burke's "star power" would prove key to getting the project o the ground. On 25 January 1967, Murray Creed, head of the Farms and Fisheries Department, met with Doug Nixon, the CBC's director of English television, and the project proposal was given the green light, with the stipulation that the lms must be made interesting enough to maintain the interest of a general audience.
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Gosnell began educating himself on the subject, seeking out experts on urban air pollution in Ottawa, Montreal, Syracuse, New York City, and Washington, D.C. while research assistants were dispatched to the heavily industrialized cities of Windsor, Sarnia, Hamilton, and Detroit. rough April the research concentrated on issues pertaining to urban air pollution. e rst signs of crop damage related to the ERCO plant were reported in 1961-just three years a er it began operating-when Port Maitland farmer Joseph Casina and his customers noticed a signi cant decline in the quality of his produce. Casina suspected industrial fumes from the nearby plant might be at fault, so he contacted the Department of Agriculture, which in turn noti ed the Department of Health's Air Pollution Control Bureau. 22 As the problems continued unabated, Casina struck up a dialogue with W.B. Drowley, director of the Air Pollution Control Bureau, and Everett Biggs, deputy minister of the provincial agriculture department, in the hopes of determining the root cause of the damage. Despite e orts to measure pollution in the area, the government ofcials refused to point the blame at ER-CO's e uent. Meanwhile, the problem worsened. In 1963, area cows began to exhibit symptoms of foot rot. In 1964, Biggs wrote Casina con rming that the "crop damage… appears to be caused by certain industries in the area."
23 By August numerous cattle had died under mysterious circumstances, and Casina himself had been hospitalized. 24 In the summer of 1965 urinary and bone analysis conducted at the Ontario Veterinary College con rmed that area cattle had been a icted with bovine uorosis; monitors set downwind of the plant during this period likewise revealed high levels of uoride residues. As evidence continued to mount that uoride emissions from ERCO were responsible for the cattle and crop damages, negotiations began between the Ontario Federation of Agriculture, representing the local farmers, and ERCO. In September 1965 the parties agreed on the selection of an arbitrator to assess the value of damages. According to the settlement's guidelines, ERCO would cover the costs of damages to crops, ornamental plantings, and livestock, but only for the current year. Furthermore, before payments were made, ERCO required farmers to sign a release acknowledging payment was not an admission of guilt on the part of ERCO, and that the recipient waived the right to further damages through the end of 1965. 25 e vast majority of a ected farmers signed the agreement, either because they felt it was the only available avenue for compensation or because they were forced into it by immediate nancial need. A total of $86,188.94 was awarded to the farmers in 1965; an additional $112,221.74 was secured for damages experienced the following year.
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To this point, attention had been focused on the impact uoride e uent was having on farmers' crops and livestock. A more eerie possibility would arise in June 1967 when Gosnell met Dr. George Waldbott, a Detroit-based allergist. In the months that followed, the two held numerous telephone conversations discussing the situation in Dunnville. Gosnell would later describe Waldbott as "certainly the most knowledgeable medical man we'd spoken to about uoride, " 27 and consequently, with the support of local farmers, invited him to visit Dunnville on 13 September in order to discuss symptoms with locals. Of the nine farmers he saw, Waldbott determined that two were su ering from uorine intoxication, a potentially fatal a iction.
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Although Waldbott was a well-regarded allergist who served on the sta of Wayne State University and two local hospitals, 29 he was a controversial gure within the medical establishment. A native of Germany who emigrated to the United States shortly a er earning his medical degree in 1921, by the 1950s his research began to link water uoridation with health problems. While water uoridation was one of the period's most contentious public issues, as evident in the 136 plebiscites and referendums held on the issue across Canada during the years 1960-66, it had been endorsed by expert bodies such as the Canadian Dental Association, the Canadian Medical 25 A good review of events as they impacted the farmers can be found in J.S. 30 Gosnell later acknowledged that he knew Waldbott was an outspoken opponent of water uoridation, but that this "was a subject in which I had no professional interest." 31 Despite Gosnell's e orts to keep the issues of water uoridation and uorosis separate, Waldbott's participation in the making of e Air of Death would further in ame an already controversial project.
Gosnell attempted unsuccessfully to arrange an interview with Dr. Roy Pennington, vice-president of ERCO's Agricultural Chemicals Division, who admitted in the "Air Pollution" segment of Matinee in 1966 that the farmers' hardships were "at least in part from our operations down there." 32 In the ensuing telephone conversations, Pennington informed Gosnell that he had not received the necessary clearance from his superiors. 33 An 18 March 1969 memo by Dr. Omond Solandt, vice-chairman of the board at ERCO, reveals that the company feared being singled out in the documentary. As Solandt explained, "I felt that it was very unwise for a small company such as ERCO, which is a very minor factor in air pollution on a national basis, to appear on such a program. Responsibility for representing industry on such a program should be taken by the big industries for whom waste disposal is a major continuing problem." condition, a large smokestack, children playing outside an industrial factory, and a hospitalized man with a breathing apparatus inserted through his trachea, Burke continued to set the tone with his voice-over:
You're an old man in a box or a child at play. You can't choose not to breathe. You must breathe een thousand quarts a day, air and poison. You've got to breathe. You breathe sulphur dioxide, which erodes stone. Benzopyrene makes cancer. Carbon monoxide impairs the mind. ey cut a hole in your throat. Death has been gathering in the air of every Canadian city. Poisons continue to accumulate and you must keep breathing. 35 Burke then appeared on camera. Against the backdrop of an industrial smokestack he explained that the six months spent researching the program was "a frightening experience." He continued:
I don't smoke myself, but I now know that I'm getting the equivalent of two packs a day right out of the air. I'm inhaling a cup-full of dirt plus poison. I didn't know what emphysema was and perhaps you don't either, but you will. It's becoming one of the major killers. In fact, lung diseases as a whole are now the number one killer in Canada, and it's rather frightening to realize that most of our hospitals are in polluted areas. ere are doctors who won't operate on dirty days. e density of automobiles in Toronto is four times what it is in Los Angeles. I used to think that air pollution was something they had in other countries, but we have it here and now in Canada, and you begin to feel like a sh in a poisoned pond. 36 Following this dramatic opening, the lm began to survey the wide range of air pollution problems experienced in major centres across Canada and the United States. It was revealed that Canadian cities, such as Toronto, Montreal, and Windsor had air quality equivalent to well-known polluted cities in the United States, such as Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles. e relationship between Sarnia's highly polluting oil and petrochemical industries and physicians' reluctance to speak out against the effects these were having on locals' health was addressed. Industry representatives were interviewed, such as Dr. L.P. Roy of the Laval Industrial Association, defending industry's right to self-regulate their emissions, while Jean Marier of Montreal's Air Pollution Control argued that the issue could only be resolved if "handled by public representatives." e lm also included an interview with Hazel Henderson of New York City's 24,000-member-strong Citizens for Clean Air. Speaking on her organization's e orts to procure clean air legislation, Henderson explained that "we have made air pollution a household word in New York City" and as a result of their campaign "nobody dared be against clean air." 37 e documentary switched gears thirty-three minutes in, putting the focus on the situation in Dunnville. Over a montage of farmers handling shriveled produce and their cattle limping through elds, Burke dramatically summarized the issue: 35 e Air of Death, DVD. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid.
ey noticed it rst in 1961, again in '62 -worse each year. Plants that didn't burn were dwarfed-grain yields cut in half. He [a local farmer]'ll show you his fruit trees. e twenty-year-old orchard, trees that produced so richly for so many years. Now for six years, they've given up no fruit at all for market; random apples not worth picking. Finally a greater disaster revealed the source of the trouble. A plume from a silver stack-once the symbol of Dunnville's progress-spreading for miles around: poison. Fluorine. It was identi ed by veterinarians. ere was no doubt. What happened to the cattle was unmistakable, and it broke the farmers' hearts. Fluorosis-swollen joints, falling teeth, pain -until cattle lie down and die, hundreds of them. e cause:
uorine poison from the air. Under arbitration, the Electric Reduction Company paid the farmers two hundred and eighteen thousand dollars for the loss of crops and cattle. Shriveled crops, limping cattle-but now is there a graver development? 38 is "graver development" was the suspicion that the uorine pollution was causing human health issues. To this e ect, Burke was shown chatting with farmers Joe Casina and Ted Boorsma, who attributed their undiagnosed ailments, characterized by severely aching joints and swollen feet, to ERCO's e uent.
e documentary then entered its nal, most contentious, segment. Burke introduced Dr. Matthew Dymond, the an ecological call to arms 38 Ibid. Ontario health minister, who was in studio for an interview. Burke announced that ERCO declined to send a representative; in its place, the set featured an empty chair. Dymond expressed concern regarding the human health problems portrayed but was quick to defend ERCO, stating that their pollution control e orts had limited "at least… ninety percent of the emissions." Following up on the human health concern, a video was then introduced of Dr. Waldbott, who announced that two of the nine local farmers he examined displayed symptoms typical of those su ering from uorine intoxication. Asked what he expected would happen if these two were le untreated, Waldbott's response was unequivocal: "If they continue to live in this area, eventually they are going to get more serious harm, serious damage to their joints-to their internal organs, particularly to their kidneys, and also to their brain and to the spine, which eventually will lead to death." 39 When the documentary returned to the studio Burke asked Dymond for his response. A er acknowledging "that Dr. Waldbott has done a very great deal of work in the study of uorosis" and that he was "among the most extensively quoted [authorities] on the continent and maybe in the world, " Dymond emphasized that the symptoms were likely the result of a more common ailment, such as arthritis.
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Discussion then turned to the jurisdiction for controlling air pollution. Dymond placed the onus on the federal government, noting that "air pollution doesn't recognize any geographic boundaries." A clip was then shown of Allan MacEachen, the federal health minister, who argued that the British North America Act assigns responsibility for addressing air pollution to the provinces. While he acknowledged that the federal government could play a role coordinating the provinces, MacEachen concluded by stating that "we do not have fresh plans at the present time for presentation to the provinces." As images of industrial smokestacks lled the screen, Burke delivered his stirring conclusion: So who will control air pollution? e cities? It's been tried and it hasn't worked very well. Among other things cities compete with one another to try to attract polluting industries. e provinces? Of course, but even provinces compete for industry and it's going on right now. Most authorities agree that it must be a cooperative e ort from the federal government right on down, and most agree that it's urgent. We don't even have the detailed statistics in Canada. We don't know what's going on, and we may be right now well on our way toward our rst disaster. We've cited some examples in this program and we could cite others, many others. Out on the prairies, 'where the skies are not cloudy all day, ' they have fairly serious pollution problems. ment for an internal production. While the program attracted a steady audience across the demographics, the report's authors noted that twelve percent of viewers were teenagers, making it "an audience much younger than that normally attracted to most CBC information and public a airs programs." e lm received "an overall index of enjoyment of 81" which the authors noted "represents a very high level of praise indeed, " while "90 per cent reported feeling that they knew either 'a great deal more' or 'quite a bit more' about the problems and dangers of air pollution than they knew before" as a result of viewing it. 42 As Arthur Laird, director of research at the CBC, wrote to Murray Creed, "Actually, 'Air of Death'
[sic] was so well received that it is dicult to point to anything in the program that, from the audience's point of view, went seriously wrong-nor to anything that, had it been done otherwise, would have been likely to increase substantially the program's general impact." 43 e program also proved to be a critical success. According to Roy Shields' October 23 "TV Tonight" column in the Toronto Star, "Today we all feel a little more grimy thanks to Stanley Burke, producer Larry Gosnell and the boys of the CBC's farm department." As he explained, " is was a well-researched, highly-documented program that must have shocked thousands of easy-breathing viewers from coast to coast. For taking a rm journalistic position that Canadians have been living in a fool's paradise of pollution, the program did the nation a service."
44 Bob Blackburn, television critic at the Toronto Telegram, was equally enthusiastic about the production. Calling it "one of the more venturesome things the CBC has done in public a airs, " he was particularly taken by the manner the message was delivered. "It didn't get hysterical. It didn't have to. It just calmly recounted the manner in which not only city-dwellers but some rural folk also are quietly being poisoned while no one does anything e ective about it." If anything, Blackburn posited that the documentary was not su ciently alarmist to jolt the public into action. 45 e fallout from the documentary began on the night of the press screening-19 October -when the Ontario health minister announced his department would conduct medical tests to determine the source of the farmers' illnesses. 46 Eight days later, Dymond announced a public inquiry into all forms of uoride pollution in the Dunnville area, exploring its impact on human, animal, and plant health, as well as its nancial toll. While the government ac- cepted that the uorosis poisoning found in local cattle was the result of ingesting "crops exposed to uoride emissions, " it argued that it was far less likely that there were any cases of human uorosis, as only a small part of the human diet would consist of local produce, and even this was routinely washed and cooked prior to consumption. 47 For its part, ERCO maintained a steadfast public denial that their plant was causing human health problems, although Omond Solandt expressed some concern about the company's culpability in a letter to Sir Owen Wansbrough-Jones, chairman of the parent company Albright & Wilson Ltd. Due to an unpleasant sulphur aroma in local wells, some residents collected and drank rainwater. As Solandt noted, "It is highly unlikely but just possible that they could have ingested signi cant amounts of uorine from this source." population's health. e commissioners also relied upon a selective reading of scienti c research. As they explained in the nal report, " is report will not contain a complete survey of the [scienti c] literature; it is not the responsibility of the commissioners to do so." e commissioners therefore focused upon the scienti c data derived from those they deemed "the recognized and accepted scientists." 57 Consequently, studies that documented human uorosis and other forms of industrial uoride pollution were routinely excluded, and the case of Garrison, Montana, was never discussed during the Hall Commission.
Evidence of deleterious human health conditions caused by ERCO was also denied proper hearing. Locals complained on the stand of ill-e ects, including sore eyes, burnt lips, and respiratory problems, caused by the industrial dust settling in the area. However, the commissioners blocked local physician Dr. F.D. Rigg from discussing the residents' symptoms, alternately arguing that it was inappropriate to discuss patients' symptoms in their absence and that the doctor was not quali ed to diagnose uorosis. 58 e commissioners also prevented discussion of a report prepared by the Ontario Water Resources Commission in 1965 that revealed uoride levels as high as 37.8 parts per million-far beyond the danger threshold of 2.4 parts per million. E orts by the farmers' lawyer to discuss this were blocked, with the promise by the Hall Commision's lawyer that it would be discussed later when an OWRC representative was available to interpret the test results. When the topic was nally re-addressed, the results were summarily discredited because one of the thirty samples was not properly labeled.
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Also missing from the Hall Commission were the gures central to the creation of e Air of Death. From the outset the CBC took the position that it would not participate in the hearings, arguing that provincial commissions lack jurisdiction over federal agencies. Likewise, the CBC took a strong position in support of those involved in the production of e Air of Death, promising to appeal any e orts to subpoena witnesses. 60 Although no subpoenas were issued, the commissioners did pressure Gosnell to provide evidence supporting fourteen contentious statements made in the documentary. Although the CBC initially refused to respond-a letter from Marcel Munro, acting general manager, Network Broadcasting (English) reminded the inquiry's secretary that the CBC "is an ecological call to arms 57 accountable to Parliament for the conduct of its a airs and the discharge of its responsibilities" 61 -the network eventually relented and prepared a detailed, seventy-one page response. 62 Dr. Waldbott was also absent from the inquiry. He wrote the Hall Commission on 1 January 1968, announcing that he would appear; however, he stressed that he required additional time to prepare his documentation. In February he contacted the inquiry's secretary in an e ort to arrange an appearance. Despite receiving a letter of acknowledgment, he later insisted the Hall Commission did not attempt to work him into the schedule. e commissioners dismissed this notion in their nal report, stating that "he saw t not to submit himself for cross-examination." 63 Waldbott consequently submitted a detailed brief containing updated evidence on examinations of twenty locals, in which "10 presented de nite evidence of uorosis, [while] seven should be suspected of ille ects from uoride." 64 Although receipt of this brief is acknowledged in the Hall Report, it is noted that " e Committee rejects many of the statements made by Dr. Waldbott in his brief and accepts the testimony of the physicians and other scientists received in evidence and referred to or quoted in the Committee's report." 65 In his absence, Waldbott was the target of much mud-slinging. Despite Dymond's recognition of him in e Air of Death as one of the leading authorities on uorosis, he was depicted throughout the hearings as a fanatical and irrational opponent of the uoride industry.
e Hall Report was tabled in the provincial legislature on 10 December 1968. Although some criticism was leveled at ERCO-particularly that it should "install the necessary equipment and modify their operations to reduce dust emissions from the lagoons, and emissions from the curing sheds, to acceptable limits under full plant operation" -it was portrayed as a good corporate citizen that was "generous, and, in some instances, more than generous" 66 when compensating local farmers. While the Committee accepted that ERCO was causing some damage to the surrounding agricultural economy, it insisted that the "people of the Port Maitland area can be assured that there is no human health hazard associated with pollutants being emitted from the industrial plants in the area." 67 e Hall Report directed considerable vitriol towards the CBC, stating that " e Committee has no other alternative but to record that unwarranted, untruthful, and irresponsible statements were made by the publicly-owned and publicly-nanced Corporation, the CBC. ey treated a complex problem in a way designed to create alarm and fear. eir treatment was not in keeping with the standards which the public is entitled to expect from the Corporation." 68 Furthermore, while the CBC program referred to the a ected farmers as Dunnville residents, in actuality they resided in the neighbouring community of Port Maitland. Given that the residents of Dunnville would su er nancial losses as a result of this mistake, the Committee recommended they undertake legal action against the CBC.
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Not surprisingly, the Hall Report's ndings drew support from ERCO. Solandt wrote Hall, noting that "I have watched your pollution investigation from the sidelines because I did not want to have an unfriendly press seize on our longstanding friendship. However, now that the Report is out and I have read it, I feel that I can safely write to congratulate you on doing an excellent job." 70 While media outlets generally accepted the ndings of the Hall Report at face value, letters critical of the Hall Report were published in the Toronto Star and Globe and Mail in the ensuing days. Most notable was a letter printed 27 February 1969 by Gavin Henderson. e rst executive director of the Conservation Council of Ontario and a co-founder of the National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada, Henderson wrote of "a disquieting similarity between the e orts to denounce Rachel Carson, " the American author whose bestselling exposé of synthetic chemicals' detrimental e ects, Silent Spring, resulted in a vicious backlash from industry, and the attempt to sti e environmental concern in Canada. 71 Comparisons to the Dunnville situation and Carson's Silent Spring were also observed in the Family Herald, which ran a 26 October 1967 editorial titled "How Many Dunnvilles To a Silent Spring?" ose associated with it are to be commended." 73 Dr. Henry Regier, a University of Toronto zoologist, stated that " e CBC should be congratulated and honoured for this production when it is considered in a broad scienti c ecological viewpoint." 74 Sta ers also received a letter from Dr. Donald Chant, chair of the Department of Zoology at the University of Toronto and one of the resource people utilized during the making of e Air of Death. A er brie y outlining the scientific shortcomings of the Hall Commission, including the failure to conduct bone biopsies that would conclusively determine if there were any cases of human uorosis, he added that " e Commission's chapter on the CBC seems petulant, almost as if it resented your intrusion into its private preserve, and contains questions out of context from 'Air of Death [sic] .'" 75 e Canadian RadioTelevision Commission Hearing O n 18 December 1968-just eight days a er the Hall Report was tabled-the CRTC announced its intent to hold hearings on the subject. 76 e ensuing notice of public hearing established a mandate to determine whether the CBC had acted responsibly in the production of the documentary. 77 It was not established to explore air pollution, and did not allow for "the introduction of evidence, scientific or otherwise of matters arising since the date of broadcast of the program." 78 ese terms proved somewhat disappointing to those involved in e Air of Death, as they had hoped for an opportunity to address the misrepresentations made during the Hall Commission.
While the CBC maintained its support of its embattled employees, recognition that their interests were not entirely congruent led the Corporation to hire Creed, Gosnell, and Burke their own separate legal counsel. ey attained the services of Joseph Sedgwick, a prominent Toronto lawyer who had served as treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada in 1962-63. 79 e trio also began strategizing with Victor Yannacone, the renowned co-founder of the United Statesbased Environmental Defense Fund. In these sessions, which involved numerous telephone calls and at least one weekend meeting, Yannacone peppered the Canadians with advice. Hailing theirs as "the most worthy cause we have had in a long time, " Yannacone emphasized the necessity of having all relevant research and documentation clearly organized and readily available during the hearings. 80 e CRTC hearing began on 18 March 1969. Chairman of the commission was Harry J. Boyle, vice-chairman of the CRTC. He was joined by Réal errien, a member of the CRTC's executive committee, and Dr. Northrop Frye, the noted literary critic and theorist. e commission began with a screening of e Air of Death. Before the rst witness could take the stand, Jacques Alleyn, the CBC's general counsel, outlined the Corporation's feelings regarding the hearing. As he argued, the CBC required an untrammeled press, free from pressures other than those resulting from law. According to Alleyn, " is is the price to be paid for democracy." 81 e rst witness to provide testimony was Eugene Hallman, who discussed the chain of command, job responsibilities, and general broadcasting policies at the Corporation. When Gosnell took the stand next, the CBC's strategy became apparent. A er a brief discussion of the origins and development of the project, Gosnell would spend the bulk of the next two days introducing the extensive research behind e Air of Death into the o cial record. With three ling cabinets of documentation and a list of an ecological call to arms approximately 170 research and production contacts at Gosnell's side, this was a move clearly intended to counter the Hall Commission's allegations of shoddy preparation on the CBC's behalf. e approach worked. As Boyle announced partway through the second day of testimony: "If it is a matter of establishing the amount of research that Mr. Gosnell has undertaken with a crew in terms of his actual program, he has demonstrated now that I don't know how he had time for the program…. I would suggest to you that you have amply demonstrated this point-the degree and the extent of the research of Mr. Gosnell and his group. If it is possible to expedite it by ling it in a group, we would appreciate it."
82 Gosnell was followed on the stand by Stanley Burke, who described his role in the production. Asked by Alan Golden, counsel for the inquiry, if he felt the subject matter justi ed exaggeration on behalf of the lmmakers, Burke assured him that "I don't consider that there was any exaggeration in the 'Air of Death ' ments by arguing e Air of Death must be held to a higher standard of factuality because of Burke's role as a prominent newscaster. Larry Gosnell's appearance on the stand drew rave reviews from his superiors at the CBC. As George F. Davidson, the Corporation's president, wrote in a 31 March 1969 letter, "You made all of us proud, -all of us who belong to and believe in the CBC,-by the quality of your testimony and by the evident integrity re ected by your presence and your evidence given from the witness box." 85 is was followed by a letter on 1 April 1969 from Eugene Hallman, who noted, "I admired the way you conducted yourself during the CRTC hearings into 'Air of Death [sic] ' . e Corporation could not have had a better witness and I was proud of the way in which the research data had been assembled so carefully, not simply for the presentation at the hearings but for the broadcast itself." 86 Gosnell's performance was even more impressive in light of the fact that he was a last-minute replacement for Murray Creed, whose appearance at the CRTC hearings was cancelled two days prior by the onset of labyrinthitis, an inner ear disorder that causes hearing loss and balance problems. 87 e CRTC Report T he CRTC released its report on 9 July 1970. e Air of Death received a general vindication, with the CRTC stating that " e program adequately re ected the information reasonably available at the time of the broadcast and is well able to stand as an example of informational programming backed by a wealth of research and serving a useful purpose." 88 Furthermore, it was added that "It is the opinion of the Committee that Air of Death [sic] may well have been one of the most thoroughly researched programs in the history of television broadcasting." e CRTC Report also noted "that the use of the term 'Dunnville' to describe the area allegedly a ected by uoride emissions was reasonable and proper in this instance." 89 e production did not go without critique, however. First, the Committee argued that e Air of Death should have highlighted the fact that con icting medical opinion existed regarding human uorosis. e fact that the information broadcast was based primarily on the opinion of Waldbott, who was "known to hold sharply critical views on the e ect of any uoride emissions upon human health, " 90 should have been explained, as should the fact that his opinions were highly controversial within the medical community. Second, the Committee argued that the segment featuring Allan MacEachen wrongly implied that the federal government was powerless to address air pollution, as unaired portions of his interview indicated the federal government was engaged in extensive research on the subject, and was trying to co-ordinate the provinces in an e ort to address the problem. In light of this, the CRTC Report stated that "constructive statements should be given due prominence." 91 e Committee also criticized the fact that Dymond commented on-screen about MacEachen's statements, but that MacEachen was not given the opportunity to rebut. Despite the criticism, the CRTC Report was viewed positively by the embattled CBC employees. "All in all I was very happy with the C.R.T.C.
ndings, " wrote Creed in a 15 July 1970 memo to the CBC's regional supervisors. " ere are things with which one could quibble but there seems to be little point in argument. Better than 'irresponsible, unwarranted and untrue' in any case." As Creed added, in the last line of the memo, "I believe we can now write Q.E.D. 93 On 25 January 1968, GASP held its rst press conference in which it "deplore[d] the atmosphere of recrimination, distrust and abuse" then underway at the Hall Commission. 94 While it appeared that the group had a solid support base, complete with ve directors and a twenty-member "permanent committee, " it soon therea er lost its momentum. While the group made a few more public appearances and submitted a brief to the CRTC voicing its approval of e Air of Death in March 1969, it shortly therea er ceased operations.
More substantial was the emergence of Pollution Probe. e roots of this group can be traced to the University of Toronto's student newspaper, e Varsity, whose sta was concerned that e orts to discredit the lmmakers overshadowed the documentary's warnings of environmental degradation. e situation was deemed particularly egregious because of Omond Solandt's position as the University of Toronto's chancellor. Initial plans to write a brief defending the CBC employees at the forthcoming CRTC hearings inspired the idea of taking more concrete steps, and in a 24 February 1969 article news editor Sherry Brydson announced plans to form "a group action committee, the U of T Pollution Probe, " with the mandate to investigate the origins and e ects of pollution, as well as "mobilizing the public, private and government sectors to action in removing the poisons from our air-before it's too late." 95 Brydson's article resonated with the university community. e rst two meetings, held in the spring of 1969, attracted several hundred concerned parties. e politically-charged climate of university campuses during this period proved integral in the growth of Pollution Probe. As cofounder Stanley Zlotkin explains, "It was a period of fairly non-passive thinking, and I think Pollution Probe was a manifestation to a certain extent of that. You know, we really did feel we could in uence what happened in the future and it was ours to in uence." 96 However, just as important as e Air of Death's alarming message in attracting support from the university community was the ensuing controversy. When asked why the documentary inspired so many to react, Brian Kelly, another Pollution Probe co-founder, explains that "it was not just a story about industrial air pollution, it was a story about Canada's economic elite having the power to suppress that information…. It was a classic late-sixties struggle between the economic elites versus the public interest. It was an issue about power, not pollution necessarily." 97 Comprised of University of Toronto students and faculty, Pollution Probe was registered from the outset as a project of the school's Department of Zoology. is development, which came as a result of department chair Donald Chant's support for their work, provided the upstart environmentalists with o ce space and a small budget; more importantly, the afliation provided Pollution Probe with an instant source of credibility. While Chant was their most vociferous champion, providing them with the necessary support and o en serving in the early days as a public spokesperson and advisor, many members of the department's faculty would lend their expertise. Pollution Probe's rst public activity was a 5 March 1969 appearance before the CRTC in which the organization adamantly supported Gosnell, Burke, and e Air of Death. It would begin to gain notoriety in July when it organized a public inquiry a er a number of ducks were found dead o the Toronto Islands. Having linked the waterfowl's deaths with the reckless use of toxic chemicals by the Metro Toronto Parks Department, Pollution Probe enlisted Dr. Er-nest Sirluck, dean at the University of Toronto School of Graduate Studies, Dr. Robert McClure, the moderator of the United Church, and the internationally renowned Dr. Marshall McLuhan, director of the University of Toronto's Centre for Culture and Technology, to examine the issue. 98 Pollution Probe returned to the headlines in November 1969 when it organized a mock funeral for the heavily polluted Don River. e event, which featured a funeral procession and 200 "mourners, " received media coverage across the country, including spots on the CTV National News and the front page of the Globe and Mail. 99 Pollution Probe further solidi ed its national pro le when it weighed in on the ongoing debate concerning phosphate content in laundry detergents. In December 1965 the International Joint Commission [IJC] urged the governments of Canada and the United States to reduce the amount of phosphate discharged into the waterways, as it was responsible for massive algal blooms found on the Great Lakes and elsewhere. A follow-up report issued by the IJC in October 1969, which recommended that the level of phosphate in detergents be lowered, was ercely opposed by industry, which countered that the best solution would be to improve sewage treatment facilities. 100 Rather than waiting for industry and the various levels of government to come to an agreement, the organization decided it would take it upon itself to break the deadlock. A group of students, led by Brian Kelly, spent the Christmas 1969 holidays holed up in a campus laboratory analyzing the phosphate content of laundry detergents.
e results were veri ed with industry and government scientists 101 and released during a twelve-minute segment on CBC television's "Weekend" on 8 February 1970. e list, read by Kelly and Peter Middleton, revealed a vast range in phosphate levels, from a high of 52.5 percent of the total to a low of 10.5 percent. When asked for recommendations on how consumers should proceed, Middleton urged them to use the low phosphate options, noting that " e gures are out now-the consumer can make an intelli-98 gent choice."
102 By the end of March 1970 over 7,000 requests for copies of the list poured into Pollution Probe's mailroom; likewise, it was reprinted in numerous magazines and newsletters, and displayed in Loblaws, Dominion, and Steinberg's grocery stores.
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By April 1970 Pollution Probe had grown to 1,500 members. It had also demonstrated a knack for organizing high-pro le activities and, increasingly, an ability to procure the funds necessary to grow its operations, as evidenced by the emergence of a paid sta of sixteen. Subsequently, it would play the role of "big brother" within the burgeoning Canadian environmental movement. One of the most obvious examples of this was in the rise of independently operated Pollution Probe a liates across the country. While the greatest concentration were located in Ontario, where y a liates were in place by the end of 1971, they could be found as far west as Winnipeg and as far east as Moncton. 104 It developed infrastructure for the environmental movement, including the Canadian Association on the Human Environment, an umbrella group created in 1970 that represented environmental activist organizations in nine provinces, and the Canadian Environmental Law Association, the country's rst environmental law clinic, which was founded in 1972.
105 Pollution Probe was also in frequent contact with environmental activists as far a eld as Vancouver and Halifax, sharing their insight on e ective action and fundraising techniques. 106 Pollution Probe would continue to grow throughout the 1970s. Likewise, it would rapidly move beyond its initial focus on air and water pollution. In autumn 1970 it launched the Energy and Resources Project, which cited a link between Canada's energy sector and the consumer-driven growth ethos that imperiled society. In the a ermath of the 1973 oil crisis this morphed into Energy Probe, a semi-autonomous group that gained complete autonomy in 1980. In 1978 Pollution Probe launched the bi-monthly Probe Post, a long-running magazine that highlighted key activities and concerns of environmentalists across Canada. Two years later, having outgrown its University of Toronto roots, Pollution Probe moved into Ecology House, a three story Victorian house located in the Annex. Retro t to utilize the latest in energy e cient technology, Ecology House would double as the organization's headquarters and as a popular demonstration site. Furthermore, former Pollution Probe sta ers would maintain prominent positions within the emerging Canadian environmental movement, including Monte Hummel, the longtime executive director and president of the World Wildlife Fund Canada, Peter Middleton, whose environmental consulting rm, the rst of its kind in Canada, was primarily sta ed by his former Pollution Probe colleagues, an ecological call to arms
